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KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: THE SWEEPING
GRANT OF GOVERNMENT POWER AND THE CONDEMNATION OF AMERICAN PROPERTY RIGHTS
Ian P. Hennessey
On June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court
issued its ruling in the now infamous case of Kelo v. City of
New London.' In its first major ruling on eminent domain
since 1984,2 the Court decided whether a city's exercise of
its eminent domain power to transfer property to private
the "public use" requirement of
developers complied with
3
Amendment.
Fifth
the
In 1984, the Court held that under the Fifth
Amendment, a government may use its eminent domain
power as long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose" as defined by the legislature. 4 Because of
the Court's ruling, virtually no check on government use
(or abuse) of eminent domain to seize property from private
individuals and transfer it to private entities now exists.
This article is divided into three main sections. In
the first section, I will briefly summarize the development
of law concerning eminent domain, focusing mainly on
cases cited by the Court in its opinion. In the second section, I will summarize the Kelo case, beginning with its
factual background and lower court decisions and ending
with a summary of the Court's treatment of the case. In the
third section, I will analyze and critique the Court's reasoning as well as the alternative approaches offered by the
other Justices. In the process, I will argue that the Court's
deference to legislative determinations is not only a flawed
1Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
3U.S. CONST.

amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for

public use, without just compensation.").
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
1
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argument but also threatens to diminish the fundamental
right of property.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

Nowhere in the Constitution is the power of eminent domain enumerated. Rather, the power is implied by
the Fifth Amendment, 5 which states, in relevant part, that
private property shall not be "taken for public use, without
just compensation.",6 The scope of "public use" was not
elaborated by the Framers.
Early Court rulings supported the notion that "public use" was interpreted narrowly. In Calder v. Bull, 7 Justice Chase declared that a legislative act that purports to
"take property from A. and give it to B" would be "contrary to the greatfirstprinciples of the social compact" and
"cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
8
authority."
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the Court
gradually abandoned the natural law principles articulated
by Justice Chase in favor of what the Court now refers to as
"the broader and more natural interpretation of public use
as 'public purpose."'
5U.S. CONST.

9

In Clark v. Nash,10 the Court deter-

amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a

capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken
for public use, without just compensation.").
6
1d.
7Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
8
d.at 388.
9Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo IV), 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005);
see, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64
(1896).
2
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mined whether a taking in which a state government condemned privately owned land to be used as an irrigation
ditch to irrigate other privately owned land violated the
"public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment." The
Court upheld the taking by deferring to the determinations
of the state courts. 12 Similarly, in Strickley v. Highland
Boy Gold Mining Co., 13 the Court determined whether a
taking in which the state condemned privately owned land
to be used as an aerial right of way for a privately held
mining company violated the "public use" requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. 14 The Court again upheld the taking
and emphasized "the inadequacy
of use by the general
' 15
public as a universal test."
By 1916, the abandonment of "use by the general
public" as the test for determining "public use" was considered established law. 16 However, the Court maintained
that "the question [what is a public use] remains a judicial
one which this Court must decide in performing its duty of
enforcing the provisions of the Federal Constitution." 17
In Berman v. Parker,18 the Court considered whether the taking of a non-blighted department store as part of a
broader urban renewal project violated the "public use"
requirement. 19 Under the proposed redevelopment project,
Congress planned to condemn a large blighted area of the
District of Columbia for the construction of roads and public buildings and to "lease or sell the remainder as an enti10 Clark

v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property

be taken for
public use, without just compensation."); Clark, 198 U.S. at 367.
See Clark, 198 U.S. at 369-70.

Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining, Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).

14 See id. at 529.
15Id. at

531.

16 See Mount Vernon-Woodberry

Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate

Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
17 Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).
18 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
19 See id.

at 29-31.
3
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rety or in parts to a redevelopment company, individual, or
partnership. 20 Although the petitioner's department store
was not blighted, it was nonetheless designated for taking,
and the Court upheld the taking.2 1 The Court stated that the
government's eminent domain power was coterminous with
"the police power," the definition of which "is essentially
the product of legislative determinations addressed to the
purposes of government ... ,,2 The Court determined
that, "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when
the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation ... ,,3
Therefore, "[t]he role of the judiciary in determining
whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose
is an extremely narrow one."2 4
Three decades later, in HawaiiHousing Authority v.
Midkiff,2 5 the Court again considered the "public use" requirement, this time in response to efforts by the State of
Hawaii designed to break up the concentration of land
ownership in its state by allowing for the transfer of fee
simple title from lessors to lessees, at the election of the
lessees, through condemnation proceedings. 26 The Court
upheld the taking and reiterated that "[t]he 'public use'
requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police power. 27 Therefore, "where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose," the Court will not hold "a com-

20 Id.at 30.
21Id.at 34.
22Id. at
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Haw.
26

32.

Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
See id. at 231-33.
27 Id.at 240.
4
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pensated 8 taking to be proscribed by the Public Use
2
Clause.,
THE KELO DECISION
29
The dispute in Kelo v. City of New London
emerged from a planned redevelopment of the Fort Trumbell area of New London, Connecticut, which suffered from
a poor economy and high unemployment.3 0 In wake of its
worsening economic condition, the city of New London
reactivated the New London Development Corporation
(NLDC), a private nonprofit entity established to assist 31
the
city of New London in planning economic development.
In 1998, the pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer, Inc., announced that it would open a major research facility in the
Fort Trumbell area. 32 Hoping to draw momentum for economic revitalization from Pfizer's arrival, the NLDC
drafted an integrated development plan that focused on
ninety acres of the Fort Trumbell area, including a waterfront conference hotel, a small urban village consisting of
restaurants, shops, office space, residences, several marinas, a pedestrian river walk, a state park, a United States
33
Coast Guard Museum, and other proposed improvements.
In addition, the NLDC would enter into long-term ground
leases with private developers - for nominal rent - in exchange for the developers' promise "to develop the land
according to the" plan drafted by the NLDC.34 The NLDC
believed that the plan would revitalize New London's

28 Id. at 241.
29 Kelo v. City

of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

30 See id. at 472-73.

See id. at 473.
See id.
31 See id. at 474.
34 See id. at 476 n.4.
31
32

5
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economy
by creating new jobs and generating tax reve35
nue.
"[A]pproximately 115 privately owned properties,"
including those owned by the petitioners, were located in
the area designated for redevelopment by the NLDC. 36 Of
the fifteen properties in the Fort Trumbell area owned by
the petitioners, ten were "occupied by the owner or a family member," whereas "the other five [were] held as investment properties." 37 To acquire the land necessary to realize
the ambitious development plan, New London authorized
the NLDC38 to condemn land through eminent domain proceedings.
Although the NLDC succeeded in negotiating the
purchase of most of the property located in the Fort Trumbell area, it failed to convince the petitioners to sell. 39 In
November 2000, the NLDC began condemnation proceedPetitioners
ings to acquire the petitioners' properties. 40
filed suit claiming, in part, that the proposed taking of their
property for a "public benefit" violated the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 4 1 The trial court
granted injunctive relief to the petitioners. 42 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all the proposed
takings were valid.43 The court concluded, inter alia, that
the proposed takings qualified as a "public use" under both
the Connecticut and United States Constitutions, 44 stating
that "economic development projects . . . that have the
3 See id. at 474.
36 See id. at 473-74.
17 Id. at 475.
38 See id.
9See id.
See id.
41
See id.
40

See Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo 1), No. 557299, 2002 WL
500238, at *112 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).
43 Kelo v. City of New London (Kelo II), 843 A.2d 500, 574 (Conn.
2004).
42

44 Id.

at 527.
6
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public economic benefits of creating new jobs, increasing
tax and other revenues, and contributing to urban revitalization, satisfy the public use clauses of the state and federal
constitutions." 45 Following the ruling of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiora6
4

ri.

OPINION OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court focused its inquiry on "whether
the city's proposed disposition of this property qualifies as
a 'public use' within the meaning of the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. .

..

,47 The Court held that the tak-

ings "unquestionably serve[d] a public purpose" and therefore, satisfied48 the "public use" requirement of the Fifth
Amendment.
The Court began its inquiry by dismissing as illegitimate any use of the eminent domain power, which attempts to "take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to ... B," even if paid just compensation. 49

However, the majority emphasized that the Court had "long
ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public." 50 By the
Court's reasoning, such a narrow view of the "public use"
requirement was not only "difficult to administer" but also
"impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs
of society." 51 Citing its precedent in Strickley52 and

45

Id. at 520.

46 Kelo v.City of New London (Kelo 111), 542 U.S. 965 (2004).
47 Kelo v. City of New London, (Kelo IV)545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
48

1Id.at 484.

49Id.
at 477.
50Id.
at 480

(citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244

(1984)).
51

Id.

7
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Clark,53 among other cases, the Court reaffirmed its rejection of the "narrow test" requiring use by the general public. 54 Instead, the Court chose to embrace what it called
"the broader and more natural interpretation of public use
as 'public purpose."' 55 Thus, although conceding that New
London was not "planning to open the condemned land...
to use by the general public" and that the private lessees
would not "in any sense be required to operate like common carriers, making their services available to all comers,",56 the Court concluded that these facts alone did not
violate the "public use" requirement.
Rather, the Court turned its analysis to whether the
development plan served a "public purpose."' 57 Relying on
its precedents in Berman and Midkiff, 58 the Court reaffirmed that "[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined
[public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstandingxolicy
As
of deference to legislative judgments in this field."
long as "the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
will not pass judgment
means are not irrational" the Court
"over the wisdom of the takings." 60
The Court rejected the petitioners' argument for the
establishment of a "bright line rule" 61 preventing the transfer of condemned property to private entities, holding that
its precedents "foreclose[d] this objection" because "the
government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit
52 See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining, Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531

(1906).

53 See Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368 (1905).
54 Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 480-81.
55
56

57

d. at 480.
Id. at 478-79.
Id. at 480.
at 484-85.

58Id.

59

60 Id.
/d.

at 480.
at 488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 24243
(1984)).
61 Id.
at 484.
8
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individual private parties. ' 62 Citing its precedent in Midkif, the Court stressed that a "taking's
purpose and not its
63
use."
"public
determined
mechanics"
The Court also rejected the petitioners' argument
that economic development takings "should require a 'reasonable certainty' that the expected public benefits will
actually accrue." 64 The Court responded that such heightened scrutiny "would represent an even greater departure
from our precedent ' 65 in which the legislature's stated
purpose was subjected only to a rational basis test. 66 The
Court determined that "[t]he disadvantages of a heightened
form of review are especially pronounced" in economic
development takings because the "required postponement
of the judicial approval" necessary for such a test would
"impose a significant impediment
to the successful con67
plans."
such
many
of
summation
ANALYSIS

The Kelo ruling presents a twofold, mutually reinforcing problem: (1) no concrete, objective definition of
what constitutes a "public use" exists and (2) the "public
use" requirement is satisfied solely upon the legislative
determination that the use is "public" and that the taking is
"legitimate." Thus, the government's power to condemn
land through eminent domain is virtually unchecked, and
fundamental property rights are at the mercy of the government officials' whims.
To comply with the Fifth Amendment, a taking
must be for "public use." The definition of "public use"
must be clearly defined to determine the limits on govern62 Id. at 485.
63Id. at 482.
64

Id. at 487.

65
66

Id. at 487-88.

67

Id. at 488.

id.

9
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ment power. The Court fails to provide such a definition,
rather electing to adopt whatever the legislative body determines to be a "public purpose" under its "longstanding
policy of deference to legislative judgments ...."68 Indeed, the Court announced that as long as "the legislature's
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational" the
Court will not pass judgment "over the wisdom of [the]
takings. 69 In Kelo, the sufficient "public purpose" that the
NLDC determined was "new jobs and increased tax revenue."570 In reality, this purported public use was simply the
aggregate collection of private benefits (new jobs) and the
government benefit of increased revenue (new taxes). The
Court announced only one exception to its deference to
legislative determinations: circumstances in which the
government attempts to condemn privately held land "for
the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular
private party." 71 However, as Justice O'Connor noted,
"[t]he trouble with economic development takings is that
private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing." 72 Thus, as Justice
O'Connor noted in her dissent, "it is difficult to envision
anyone but the 'stupid
staffer]' failing" the Court's ration73
scrutiny.
al basis
For her part, Justice O'Connor suggested a definition of "public use" that attempts to reconcile the majority
opinion that she authored in Midkiff.74 Justice O'Connor's
proposed test would allow governments to transfer condemned property to private entities only under special cir68 Id. at 480.
69 Id. at

488 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-

43
(1984)).
70
Id. at 483.
71
72

Id. at 477 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245).
Id. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26
n.12 (1992)).
73

74 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 231.

10
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cumstances. Thus, takings that transfer condemned proper-

ty to private entities would still comply with the "public
use" requirement if they involve the elimination of "existing property use . . to remedy harm." 75 Unfortunately,
Justice O'Connor's test is equally vulnerable to the deference afforded by the Court to legislative determinations
because without a clear definition, "harm" is a subjective
standard. In the end, legislatures would merely shift the

emphasis of their findings to discover a "harm" rather than
a "public purpose." Unless the Court determined a more
precise meaning of "harm," or in the alternative, the level
of harm needed to justify condemnation, Justice
O'Connor's test cannot effectively guarantee the property
rights of those whose property is targeted for taking.
As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, "the most
natural reading of the Clause is that it allows the government to take property only if the government owns, or the
public has a legal right to use, the property . ,,76 Under
Justice Thomas' approach, takings would only satisfy the
"public use" requirement when the public actually used the
property.77 Thus, the extent of a court's inquiry would be
simply to determine "whether the government owns" the

subject property or whether "the public has a legal right to
use, the taken property., 78 Consequently, the traditional
power of eminent domain would remain intact, allowing
governments to take land for public buildings and for
common carriers who serve the public at large. Private
property, however, would be protected against transfers to
private entities that do not serve the public at large. This
approach would prevent the possibility of transfers designed to confer private benefits on certain, favored private

71 Kelo IV, 545

U.S. at 500.
Id. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see id. at 506-11.
77
Id.at 521.
76

" Id.at 517.

11
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entities with only "incidental public benefits." 79 Although
his formulation is strict, Justice Thomas presents the only
concrete, objective definition of "public use" that draws a
clear line between what a government can and cannot do.
The Court's decision to abstain from an objective
definition of "public use" does not only result in the failure
to define the outer limits of government power. At the very
least, the Court is guilty of begging the question: the legislature's purpose must be public, but the legislature determines what constitutes a public purpose. Allowing the
legislature to determine whether the use is "public" and
whether the taking is "legitimate" is both unnecessary and
unjust. The public interest, as presented by the legislative
body, is already represented in the court proceeding by the
government's attorneys. It is unnecessary for a court to
represent the government's position as well. Furthermore,
legislative determination is unjust because no disinterested
review of the proposed taking's legitimacy exists. By way
of analogy, it would be as if the law required a court to
defer to the prosecutor's determination of a criminal defendant's guilt. In this type of situation, how are landowners
afforded any meaningful due process under the Fifth
Amendment when the Court has stacked the odds so heavily in favor of the government? As Justice O'Connor stated,
"[a]n external, judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted, however limited, is necessary if
this constraint on government power is to retain any meaning.",s
Perhaps sensing these problems, Justice Kennedy
proposed a "meaningful rational basis" test for a "narrowly
drawn category of takings" involving "private transfers in
which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of
private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or
otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use
id. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'0Id.
at 497.
'9See

12
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Clause."81 Kennedy concludes that the Court "should
strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to
favor a particular private party, with only incidental or
182
pretextual public benefits ....
However, it is difficult to see how Justice Kennedy's test is in any way "meaningful." By preserving "the
presumption that the government's actions were reasonable
and intended to serve a public purpose," 83 Justice Kennedy's test provides little reason to believe that a property
owner could mount a successful challenge to a legislature's
stated intentions. Justice O'Connor also criticized Kennedy's test, complaining that it failed to specify "what courts
should look for in a case with different facts, how they will
' 84
know if they have found it, and what to do if they do not."
For his part, Justice Kennedy declined to "conjecture as to
what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard
,,85

However, Justice Kennedy's reservations, as well as
the objections of Justices Thomas and O'Connor, indicate
the deeper, far more pernicious problem presented by the
majority opinion: virtually no check exists on the government's ability to take property from its citizens based on
even the slightest pretense.
The Kelo decision, however, was not a revolutionary gesture. The majority opinion is unquestionably consistent with takings precedent, as it has evolved over the
last two centuries. Instead, the Kelo decision represents the
dangerous and perverse culmination of that evolution. The
result is that the Takings Clause has emerged as a sword of
government power rather than a shield for individual property rights.
81 Id.

2

1

83

at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
/d. at 491.

id.

84 Id. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

85 Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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Dangerously absent from the Court's analysis is the
basic acknowledgment that property is a fundamental right
that the Takings Clause shields. James Madison, the architect of the Constitution and the original drafter of the Takings Clause,86 "feared that the government's power to take
property, if left unrestricted, could jeopardize private property rights."87 Thus, this concern was enshrined: "No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. . . ."88 In 1792, just months

after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, James Madison
declared, "Government is instituted to protect property of
every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of
individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses.
This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever

is his own." 89 As Justice Thomas correctly noted in his
dissent, the Framers understood property as a "natural,
fundamental right," 90 and as such, "it is 'imperative that the
Court maintain absolute fidelity to' the [Public Use]
Clause's express limit on the power of the government over
the individual, no less than with every other liberty express-

86

See JAMES

MADISON, WRITINGS

443 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Literary

Classics of the United States, Inc. 1999).

Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain
Law: A RationaleBased on Secret Purchases and PrivateInfluence,
92 CORNELL L. REv. 1,9 (2006) (citing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
87

MEANINGS: POLrrICs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrFU-

TION 314-15

(1996) ("noting that Madison's 'concern about the security
of private rights was rooted in a palpable fear that economic legislation
was jeopardizing fundamental rights of property' and that 'by 1787 a

decade of state legislation had enabled Madison to perceive how economic and financial issues could forge broad coalitions across society,
which could then actively manipulate the legislature to secure their
desired ends')).
amend. V.
supra note 86, at 515.
90 Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 510 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88 U.S. CONST.
89

MADISON,

14
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ly enumerated in 91the Fifth Amendment or the Bill of Rights
more generally."
Confronted with the conflict between an expansive
government power and an express fundamental right, deference should have been paid to the petitioners' property
rights rather than the City's determinations of "public purpose." Although the Court pays tribute to Justice Chase's
famous statement in Calder v. Bull,92 which forbids "a law
that takes property from A and gives it to B," 93 the Court
would do well to acknowledge Justice Chase's immediately
preceding statement, which forbids "a law that makes a
man a Judge in his own cause."94 Instead, the Court has

chosen to make the government the judge in its own cause
in determining the existence of a "public use" and for the
very purpose of taking property from A and giving it B.
In Kelo, the Court breached its duty to protect fundamental individual rights from the government's ambitious and intrusive designs. Although greatly expanding
the definition of "public use," the Court simultaneously
refused to include any corresponding protection of individual property rights in its analysis. At the very least, the
Court's analysis should have balanced legislative interests
against the individual property rights of the affected landowners. Although the Court imposes strict demands and
heightened scrutiny in virtually every other scenario in
which government action impedes on constitutional rights,
the Court has proved remarkably timid about applying such
protections to property rights in takings cases. However, as
James Madison said, "[i]f the United States mean to obtain
or deserve the full praise due to wise and just governments,

91

Id. at 507 (internal quotations omitted).

92

Id.at 478 n.5 (majority opinion).

93Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
9
4

id.
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they will equally respect the rights of property, and the
property in rights ... 95
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London

will stand as a case in which the Court failed to acknowledge and to protect fundamental property rights guaranteed
under the Constitution. Instead, the Court chose to defer
entirely to the judgment of the legislative entities whose
aim was to deprive its citizens of their fundamental rights
and to transfer their property to other private entities, all in
the name of creating "new jobs and increased tax revenue.",96 Confronted with these facts, the Court should have
applied a heightened standard of review to protect private
property owners against this highly questionable application of the eminent domain power. The Court refused, and
in so doing, "all private property is now vulnerable to being
taken and transferred to another private owner ..

.

who will

use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to
the public . .. .97

95

supra note 86,
96 MADISON,
Kelo IV, 545 U.S. at 483.
97

at 517.

Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16
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